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Abstract – Balancing power is used to quickly restore the supply-demand balance in power systems. The need for this tends to 
be increased by the use of variable renewable energy sources (VRE) such as wind and solar power. This paper reviews three 
channels through which VRE and balancing systems interact: the impact of VRE forecast errors on balancing reserve 
requirements; the supply of balancing services by VRE generators; and the incentives to improve forecasting provided by 
imbalance charges. The paper reviews the literature, provides stylized facts from German market data, and suggests policy 
options. Surprisingly, while German wind and solar capacity has tripled since 2008, balancing reserves have been reduced by 
15%, and costs by 50%. 
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1. Introduction 
Electricity generation from variable renewable electricity sources (VRE), such as wind and solar power, 
has grown rapidly during recent years and is expected to continue to grow. The fact that these generators 
are distributed, non-synchronous, and weather-dependent causes specific challenges when integrating 
them into power systems (Grubb 1991, Holttinen et al. 2011, IEA 2014a). With increasing amounts of 
VRE in many countries, system integration has become a major public policy debate with a particular 
emphasis on the stress that forecast errors put on balancing systems. 
Balancing power is used to stabilize the active power balance of integrated power systems on short time 
scales from seconds to hours. In AC power systems, the demand-supply balance has to hold at every 
instant of time to ensure frequency stability at, usually, 50 Hz or 60 Hz. Frequency deviations have a 
number of problematic consequences, one being that they can mechanically destroy rotating machines 
such as generators. Technical procedures and economic institutions have evolved to prevent frequency 
instability, and the most important of these is “balancing power”2.  
Electricity generation from VRE has been growing rapidly in many countries, driven by technological 
progress, economies of scale, and deployment subsidies. Global solar PV capacity has reached 140 GW, 
a fourteen-fold increase since 2007, and there has been a four-fold increase in wind power to 320 GW 
(REN21 2014). Several power systems now accommodate VRE shares of 15% to 40%, including 
Eastern Inner Mongolia, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Lithuania, and Germany. The IEA (2014b) 
projects that medium-term growth will continue and long-term models forecast that VRE shares by 2050 
will need to be several times higher than today (Fischedick et al. 2011, Luderer et al. 2014, Knopf et al. 
2013). Hence, system integration will remain challenging. 
This review paper explores the interaction of wind and solar with balancing power. We identify and 
discuss three major links between VRE and balancing systems (Figure 1). Each link has been previously 
discussed in the literature, but to the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to comprehensively 
account for the interactions between VRE and balancing power.  
Firstly, and most obviously, VRE generators, being weather-dependent and hence inherently stochastic, 
are subject to forecast errors which increase the need for holding and deploying balancing reserves. 
Secondly, however, VRE generators can also supply balancing services, although this requires policies 
and markets to be appropriately designed; balancing services supplied by VRE generators obviously 
reduce the pressure on the balancing system. Finally, the imbalance price which is the financial penalty 
for forecast errors, determines the size of forecast errors given its influence on the behavior of VRE 
generators. If set correctly, the imbalance price can stimulate more accurate forecasting and incentivize 
VRE generators to improve system stability. The three links are not independent, and policy that is only 
targeted at one of the channels is likely to be suboptimal. We hope our holistic view generates a more 
comprehensive understanding of the balancing challenge and explores the entire solution space for 
policy makers, market participants, and system operators. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 There are a multitude of names for “balancing power”. Inconsistent and diverging nomenclature is a major problem in this 
field. Here we use the most internationally common generic term “balancing power”. European transmission system 
operators have used the term “control power” (UCTE 2009), but are replacing it by “operational reserves” (ENTSO-E 
2012b). In Germany and Nordic countries, “regulating power” is more commonly used. Other names are “balancing reserve”, 
“frequency control”, and “reserve power”. Certain types of balancing power are sometimes used broadly, such as 
“regulation”, “load following”, “contingency reserves”, “frequency containment reserve”, “frequency restoration reserve”, or 
“replacement reserve”. Inertia, or “inertial response”, which is an active power response similar to balancing power, driven 
by the electromechanical properties of synchronous machines, takes place at even shorter time scales and is not discussed in 
this paper (see Ela et al. 2014). 
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 Figure 1. The three links between VRE and the balancing system. Each link will be 
discussed in one section of this paper. 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to stimulate and structure the discussion on the interaction between VRE and 
balancing power. It particularly targets practitioners such as policy makers, regulators, system operators, 
market participants, and VRE generators. It aims to provide an overview of topics, a guide through the 
literature, and a summary of policy proposals. We complement the literature review with model results 
and empirical data where appropriate. We study German markets and policies in detail, but most 
observations and recommendations also apply to other European markets, and, albeit to a lesser degree, 
to U.S. power systems. Germany is an interesting case not only because of the extent and rapid growth 
of VRE penetration, but also because of data availability, cooperation between system operators, and 
market design reforms. 
We believe that three broad conclusions can be drawn from this review. First, we find the impact of 
VRE on the balancing system to be less dramatic than sometimes believed. VRE growth has had 
moderate impact on volumes and costs of balancing power at best; in many circumstances other factors 
might have had a larger impact. Second, the design of balancing power markets constitutes an 
unnecessary entry barrier to this market, and prices in balancing and imbalance markets do not regularly 
reflect marginal costs. With appropriate market design, VRE wind and solar not only consume but can 
also provide balancing services. Finally, VRE and balancing systems interact via various channels. 
Policies interact with each other and should be considered in context. Usually, multiple policies exist to 
archive the same objective, a fact that might ease implementation challenges. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of balancing systems. Sections 3-5 
review the three links: reserve requirements, balancing power markets, and imbalance settlement. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Fundamentals of balancing systems 
We define the balancing system (or “balancing regime”) as the set of technical and economic institutions 
that are used to maintain and restore the short-term active power balance in integrated electricity 
systems. Other system (ancillary) services, such as reactive power compensation (voltage support) or 
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transmission congestion management (re-dispatch), are not within the scope of this article.3 The 
balancing system comprises two economic mechanisms: the “balancing power market” to acquire 
balancing power, and the “imbalance settlement system” to financially clear the imbalances. 
This section outlines some principles of balancing systems. We clarify the roles of different actors and 
present an overview of the types of balancing power used in continental Europe (UCTE).4 Rebours et 
al. (2007a, 2007b), TenneT (2011), ENTSO-E (2012a), Ela et al. (2011a), and Cognet & Wilkinson 
(2013) provide international comparisons. Vandezande et al. (2010) discuss economic aspects of market 
design. Kristiansen (2007) and Bang et al. (2012) provide a comprehensive survey of the Nordic 
balancing system while Ela et al. (2011a, 2011b) and NERC (2012) do the same for American systems. 
Consentec (2014) provides, in German, a descriptive overview of the German balancing system. 
This article focuses on electricity. Natural gas markets feature a similar system of balancing energy to 
which many of the general arguments apply (KEMA & REKK 2009, ACER 2011). 
2.1. Balancing what? 
Two geographic entities are involved in balancing: the synchronous system (interconnection) and 
balancing areas (control areas) within the synchronous system. The synchronous system is a geographic 
area usually equivalent to several countries, and is characterized by a common steady-state frequency. 
The continental United States features three synchronous systems (Eastern and Western Interconnect, 
ERCOT), while Europe features five synchronous systems, of which the UCTE is by far the largest.  
Balancing areas are regions, usually of the size of countries, for which one system operator is 
responsible. Balancing systems are meant to balance both the synchronous system and each balancing 
area. In the language of control theory, two variables with two set points are targeted by the balancing 
system: frequency, and the imbalance of each balancing area. The synchronous system is balanced if 
frequency is at its nominal value (50 Hz). The balancing area is balanced if net import balance is at its 
scheduled value (the area control error is zero). 
Table 1: A control theory perspective on the balancing system 
 Synchronous system Balancing area 
Geographic scope Entire system (continental 
Europe) 
Several sub-systems (countries) 
Target Variable Frequency Area control error (ACE) 
Set point 50 Hz Zero 
Rationale Avoid damages caused by 
frequency deviation 
Avoid interconnector overload; 
“polluter pays” principle 
 
 
                                                          
3 Some European countries use balancing energy for re-dispatch, or use integrated balancing power / re-dispatch mechanisms. 
Germany and most of its neighbors do not. (ENTSO-E 2015, p. 148). 
4 As an organization, the UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity) has been replaced by the 
“ENTSO-E Regional Group Continental Europe”. We refer to UCTE with the former name for convenience. 
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 Figure 2. Each synchronous system consists of one or several balancing areas. 
Balancing power is used to balance both the synchronous area (frequency at 50 
Hz) and the balancing area (area control error at zero). UCTE (or “Regional 
Group Continental Europe”) is the largest European synchronous system that 
covers all of Europe except Ireland, the UK, the Baltic and Nordic region, 
Albania, the countries east of Poland/Romania, and most islands. It is composed 
of about 25 balancing areas. Germany is divided into four balancing areas, which 
in practice are operated as one (see section 3.5). 
 
 
2.2. Roles and responsibilities 
In Europe, four types of actors interact in balancing systems: balance responsible parties, transmission 
system operators, suppliers of balancing power, and regulators.  
Balance responsible parties (BRPs) or “program responsible parties” are market entities that have the 
responsibility of balancing a portfolio of generators and/or loads. BRPs can be utilities, sales companies, 
and industrial consumers. Each physical connection point is associated with one BRP. BRPs deliver 
binding schedules to system operators for each quarter-hour of the next day,5 and are financially 
accountable for deviations from these schedules. 
Transmission system operators (TSOs) operate the transmission network and are responsible to balance 
injections and off-take in their balancing area. TSOs activate balancing power to physically balance 
demand and supply if the sum of BRP imbalances is non-zero. Specifically, TSOs have four obligations: 
1. determine the amount of capacity that needs to be reserved as balancing power ex ante 
2. acquire that capacity; determine its price (capacity and/or energy) ex ante 
3. activate balancing power; determine the imbalance price (energy) in real time 
4. financially clear the system and allocate costs (via imbalance price and/or grid fees) ex post 
Suppliers of balancing power supply reserve capacity, and deliver energy if dispatched by the TSO. 
They are obliged to deliver energy under pre-specified terms, for example within a certain time frame, 
with certain ramp rates, and for a specific duration. Suppliers are traditionally generators, but can also 
                                                          
5 Schedules are usually submitted one day in advance, but can be adjusted until about one hour ahead of delivery. In some 
markets, schedules can be adjusted after delivery by swapping volumes between BRPs in so-called ‘day after’ markets, see 
section 5. Some markets, such as in France, feature half-hourly schedules. 
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be consumers. Typically, suppliers of balancing power receive a capacity payment (€/MW·h)6 because 
capacity reservation incurs opportunity costs, and/or energy payment (€/MWh) since activation is costly.  
Regulators determine the balancing power market design. They also monitor market power and 
prescribe the pricing formula of the imbalance price. Unlike most in other markets, the rules that govern 
trade of balancing power are set by authorities and have not emerged bottom-up from market interaction. 
2.3. Types of balancing power  
Characteristics, classification, and nomenclature of balancing power vary across power systems. Since 
multiple sources of imbalances exist with different characteristics (see section 3.2), several types of 
balancing power are employed simultaneously in most power systems. Balancing power types can be 
distinguished along several dimensions:  
 purpose (operating/non-event v. contingency/event reserve) 
 state of supplying power plant (spinning v. stand-by reserve) 
 target system (synchronous system v. balancing area) 
 response time (fast v. slow) 
 activation frequency (direct/continuously v. scheduled) 
 way of activation (manual v. automatic) 
 positive, negative, or both (upward v. downward v. symmetric) 
In the UCTE, balancing power is called “control power” (UCTE 2009), and three different types are 
used: primary control, secondary control, and tertiary control. They differ in purpose, response time, 
and the way they are activated (Table 2).  
Primary control power (PC) can be fully deployed within 30 seconds. Being a shared resource within 
the UCTE, it is not activated by TSOs but by locally measured frequency deviation. At the power plant 
level, activation is implemented as turbine-governor control. PC is activated proportionally to the 
frequency deviation from 50 Hz up to full activation at deviations of 200 mHz. It is calibrated such that 
imbalances are replaced and frequency drops are contained (but not restored). Small deviations below 
10 Hz do not lead to activation (dead band). PC can be classified as a fast, automatic, symmetric spinning 
reserve that is used to balance the synchronous system. It is sized as a contingency reserve (3.3), but 
also used for operational imbalances. 
Secondary control power (SC) has to be available within five minutes after activation. It is activated 
automatically and centrally by TSOs via an automatic generation control (AGC) signal that is updated 
every few seconds. SC is used to restore nominal frequency, and to re-balance the respective balancing 
area, such that at steady-state, imbalances are replaced by SC from the same balancing area. SC can be 
supplied by some stand-by hydro plants, but is mostly provided by synchronized thermal generators. 
Hence, it is an automatic reserve with direct activation that balances both the synchronous system and 
the balancing area up and down; to a large extent, it is a spinning reserve.  
Tertiary control power (TC), or minute reserve, is used to replace SC over time. It is either directly 
activated or supplied in schedules of 15 minutes. Activation is a decision taken by TSO staff based on 
current and expected deployment of SC. TC is mostly supplied by stand-by generators. UCTE (2009, 
P1 and A1) and Rebours et al. (2007a) provide more technical details on the three types of balancing 
power. 
 
                                                          
6 This is the price of reserving capacity per MW and per hour, which is not the same as the price for delivering one MWh of 
electrical energy. Power prices are reported in different units, including €/MW per day, €/MW per week, €/MW per month, 
€/kW per year, and €/MW per year. We report all capacity prices as €/MW per hour (€/MW·h). Note that despite having the 
same unit, these capacity prices are not energy prices, which we denote as €/MWh (without the dot). 
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Table 2: Types of balancing power in the UCTE 
 Primary Control Secondary Control 
Tertiary Control 
(Minute Reserve) 
Response Time 30 secs, direct (continuous) 15 min or less7, direct 15 min, direct or scheduled 
System UCTE UCTE and balancing area UCTE and balancing area 
Target Variable Frequency ACE and frequency Current and expected level 
of SC activation 
Activation Based on local frequency 
measurement 
Centralized (TSO); IT signal 
(AGC) 
Centralized (TSO); 
phone / IT signal 
Suppliers (typical) Synchronized generators, 
(large consumers) 
Synchronized generators, 
stand-by hydro plants, large 
consumers 
Synchronized and fast-
starting stand-by generators, 
large consumers 
Reserved Capacity 3000 MW in UCTE 
(600 MW in Germany) 
Determined by TSO 
(2000 MW in Germany) 
Determined by TSO 
(2500 MW in Germany) 
2.4. TSO cooperation 
To integrate European power markets, the European Union aims to harmonize and integrate European 
balancing systems and markets. If implemented as planned, the European balancing system and all of 
its markets will significantly change in the coming years. Important actors in this process are EU 
institutions (commission and council), energy regulators (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators ACER) and TSOs (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity 
ENTSO-E). On 15 topics, ACER has published “Framework Guidelines” based on which ENTSO-E 
drafts “Network Codes”. These codes then enter the EU Comitology process after which they become 
legally binding.8  
Two of the 15 topics relate to balancing power, “Balancing Energy” and “Load-frequency Control and 
Reserves”. Framework Guidelines were finalized in 2012 (ACER 2012a, 2012b) and Network Codes 
finalized by 2014 (ENTSO-E 2013, 2014a).9 Mott MacDonald & SWECO (2013) provide an impact 
assessment of the Balancing Energy Framework Guideline. One ACER official has called the Balancing 
Energy network code “the most complex of all”.10 
The network codes introduce “frequency containment reserve” and “frequency restoration reserve” as 
common terminology for all European synchronous systems, which will replace PC, SC, and TC, and 
the reserve types used in the other synchronous areas of the European Union. The codes will also affect 
the way reserves are procured (section 4). 
In parallel to the top-down Network Codes process, several bottom-up regional TSO cooperation 
initiatives have emerged during recent years (ENTSO-E 2014b). Some initiatives focus on SC, the best-
known of which is the “International Grid Control Cooperation” (IGCC) of central European TSOs. 
They are often considered to take place in four stages, with increasing degree of cooperation: (i) 
imbalance netting, (ii) common reserve dispatch, (iii) common reserve procurement, (iv) common 
reserve sizing. Most initiatives, include the IGCC, are currently restricted to (i), which means they avoid 
opposed SC activation. Even at this stage, cost savings can be substantial (van der Veen et al. 2010, 
                                                          
7 Depending on country (ENTSO-E 2015, p. 146). German TSOs require a response time of 15 min. 
8 For an overview of the process, see also the ACER website www.acer.europa.eu/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/ 
ENTSO-E website www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/network-code-development/. 
9 On the status of Balancing Energy Network Code see 
www.acer.europa.eu/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/Pages/Balancing.aspx  
and www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/network-code-development/electricity-balancing/ 
Onthe status of the Load-frequency Control and Reserves Network Code see www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/network-code-
development/load-frequency-control-reserves/. 
10 Tahir Kapetanovic, IEWT conference, Vienna, 2015. 
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Fattler & Pellinger 2015, Sprey et al. 2015). Other TSO initiatives focus on the common procurement 
of PR, such as bilateral cooperation of the Swiss TSO with French, German, and Austrian TSOs. Steps 
(iii) and (iv) require the reservation of interconnector capacity, which comes at a cost. Gebrekiros et al. 
(2015) provide model-based evidence to show that benefits can outweigh costs. 
 
3. Balancing reserve requirement: the impact of VRE 
This section discusses the impact of VRE on balancing reserve requirements. We give an overview of 
reserve sizing methods and explain which variables cause system imbalances. We then discuss the 
impact of VRE forecast errors on the balancing reserve, and present new model results. Although studies 
disagree about the size of the impact, all models show that more VRE capacity tends to increase 
balancing requirements. Empirically, however, the German case seems to prove theory wrong: balancing 
reserves could be reduced while VRE capacity increased. Finally, we suggest a number of policy 
options. 
3.1. Reserve sizing methodologies 
TSOs need to determine the balancing reserve ex ante. The methodologies they use vary across types 
of balancing power and between TSOs. Holttinen et al. (2012) provide an overview of methodologies. 
These can be distinguished by two dimensions: probabilistic v. deterministic, and static v. dynamic. 
The idea behind deterministic approaches is to size the reserve according to a specific event, such as the 
largest credible contingency (N-1 criterion). These approaches, however, do not account for less severe 
events, their probability, or correlation between sources of imbalances. The idea of probabilistic 
(stochastic, statistic) methods is to size the reserve such that a certain, pre-defined level of system 
reliability is met. These methods estimate the probability density function of system imbalances and use 
the reliability target as a cut-off to determine the size of the reserve. Probabilistic approaches require 
detailed knowledge of sources of imbalances, their probability distribution, and their correlation. 
Reserves can be determined for long time periods such as one year (static sizing) or more frequent 
periods depending on the current or expected status of the system (dynamic sizing). Deterministic sizing 
is usually static; probabilistic sizing can be static or dynamic. 
In continental Europe, reserve requirements are codified in UCTE (2009). For PC, UCTE prescribes a 
common European deterministic-static approach: 3000 MW are reserved, in order to compensate the 
loss of two large nuclear reactors connected to the same bus bar. For SC and TC, UCTE suggests a 
number of different approaches, but leaves the decision to the TSOs. As a consequence, the level of 
SC+TC reserves vary widely – from 5% of average load in France to 14% in Belgium (Cognet & 
Wilkinson 2013). German TSOs use a static-probabilistic approach, which we will discuss in the 
following. 
3.2. Sources of imbalances 
System imbalances can stem from different sources. One way to categorize them is to distinguish 
stochastic from deterministic processes (Table 3).11 Stochastic processes are unplanned outages and 
forecast errors. Deterministic processes are the deviations between the stepwise (discrete) schedules and 
continuous physical variables. Deterministic sources of system imbalances can be forecast quite easily. 
                                                          
11 This has nothing to do with stochastic / deterministic estimation methodologies for reserve sizing. 
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Table 3: Variables that cause system imbalances 
 Stochastic Deterministic 
Thermal and Hydro Generation unplanned plant outages 
Schedule leaps 
VRE Generation forecast errors 
Interconnectors unplanned line outages 
Load forecast errors 
 
The probability of unplanned outages of power plants and transmission lines (contingencies) is a 
function of equipment characteristics (age, type) and operational decisions (maintenance, ramp rates). 
Similarly, the size of forecast errors is a function of resource characteristics (such as size and distribution 
of wind parks) and operational decisions (forecast quality, portfolio management). Operational decisions 
are subject to the economic incentive provided by the imbalance system (section 5): if imbalance prices 
are high, owners will operate their assets in a way that forecast errors and outages rates will be reduced. 
Load forecast errors are often assumed to be normally distributed (Consentec 2008). Jost et al. (2014) 
discuss characteristics of wind power and load forecast errors. Bruninx & Delarue (2014) report that 
wind power forecast errors can be approximated well with a Lévy -stable distribution. Zhang et al. 
(2015) report that wind and solar power forecast errors are weakly negatively correlated; see also Braun 
et al. (2013). 
Next to these inherently stochastic processes, there is a deterministic source of imbalances: deviations 
resulting from the way contracts are designed in liberalized electricity markets. Schedules are specified 
as discrete step functions in intervals of, typically, 15 minutes. However, physical demand and supply 
changes are smooth (Figure 3). The differences between physical and scheduled values are called 
schedule leaps. These leaps apply to all types of portfolios and are substantial in size. Figure 4 shows 
that schedule leaps are large and that deviations are greatest around full hours, indicating that many 
BRPs use hourly rather than quarter-hourly schedules (see Weißbach & Welfonder 2009, Consentec 
2010). 
 
 
Figure 3. Discrete schedules cause imbalances 
(illustration). Quarter-hourly schedules cause smaller 
imbalances than hourly schedules. 
Figure 4. Average German system imbalance for every 
minute of the day during the year 2011 (4s-data from 
TSOs). One can identify clear patterns just before and after 
full hours. These schedule leaps are quite large compared to 
the size of reserves of about 4.5 GW.12 
 
The literature often distinguishes two time scales in which imbalances occur: deviations of the dispatch 
interval mean from schedules (“forecast error”) and variations around the mean during the dispatch 
                                                          
12 Schedule leaps can also be seen in observed grid frequency: frequency deviations are clustered around the full hours during 
the morning and the evening ramp http://www.netzfrequenz.info/auswertungen/langzeitverlauf-der-
netzfrequenz.html/attachment/netzfrequenz_062011-122014; see also Weißbach & Welfonder (2009) 
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interval (“intra-dispatch interval variability” or “noise”). All four sources listed in Table 3 result in both 
forecast errors and noise. 
3.3. Probabilistic reserve sizing in Germany 
The German TSOs use a probabilistic approach to determine SC and TC capacities, sometimes called 
the “Graf/Haubrich approach” (Consentec 2008, 2010, Maurer et al. 2009). It is based on the idea of 
statistical convolution. 
In statistical terms, the balancing area imbalance follows the joint distribution of the individual factors’ 
distribution functions and the reserve is set according to a pre-defined percentile (security level) of that 
function (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Convolution-based reserve siting. The stochastic convolution of different sources of imbalance results in the 
joint distribution function. The 0.025% and the 99.975% percentile of that function determine the required amount of 
reserves. 
 
According to the most recent publicly available document on reserve sizing in Germany (Consentec 
2010), power plant outages are based on historical outage rates as reported by the VGB PowerTech 
database, schedule leaps are modeled, and forecast errors are estimated from historical system 
imbalances. The distribution functions of individual imbalance sources are not explicitly estimated. 
 
3.4. Modeling the impact of VRE on reserve requirements 
If VRE forecast errors are uncorrelated to other factors, additional wind and solar capacity ceteris 
paribus increases the size of balancing reserves. While some American studies argue that PC-type 
reserves would also increase (Brouwer et al. 2014), European studies usually find that only SC and TC 
reserves would be affected. An important assumption for any reserve impact study is the future 
improvement of generation forecasts, which are often assumed to be substantial. 
UKERC (2006), Holttinen et al. (2011), and Brouwer et al. (2014) provide surveys of the international 
modeling literature, being mostly studies of wind and solar integration. Holttinen et al. report that in 
predominately thermal power systems, most studies find that reserves increase by 2-9% of the additional 
wind capacity (20-90 MW per GW of wind power). Brouwer et al. report a wider range, but high 
estimates around 20% tend to arise in older studies. DLR et al. (2012) report 4% of additional VRE 
capacity in Germany, given a mix of solar and wind generation and significant improvements in forecast 
Hirth & Ziegenhagen (2015): Balancing power and variable renewables 11 
quality. dena (2014) report a higher value for Germany. NREL (2013), a high-quality study for the 
Western United States, report a reserve increase of 4% of additional VRE capacity. De Vos et al. (2012) 
assess wind power forecast errors in isolation and consequently find a much larger impact on reserves. 
Ziegenhagen (2013) provides a convolution-based assessment of the impact of VRE on reserve 
requirements. She finds that reserve requirements are increased by 6% of installed wind or solar 
capacity, assuming a moderate reduction of forecast errors by 30%. This number is reduced to 4% if 
both technologies are deployed simultaneously. Without forecast improvements, such a mixed 
expansion would increase reserve needs by 6.5%. If forecast errors are improved by 60%, the impact on 
reserves would be reduced to 1.5%. For up to 100 GW of additional capacity Ziegenhagen estimates the 
impact of reserve requirements to be roughly linear (Figure 6).  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6. The impact of  additional VRE capacity on balancing reserve requirement as estimated 
by Ziegenhagen (2013). 
 
 
While there is disagreement in the modeling literature about the size of the impact of VRE on balancing 
reserves, there is a consensus that additional VRE capacity increases the reserve requirement. In the 
following, we review empirical market data from Germany, which seems to prove this common 
knowledge to be wrong. 
3.5. The German experience: A paradox? 
Since 2008, German VRE capacity has grown from 27 GW to 78 GW. Wind and solar power now 
deliver 15% of consumed electricity, up from 7% in 2008. Over the same period, TSOs reduced 
balancing reserves by 15% (Figure 7). This empirical fact seems to contradict common sense as well as 
the model results presented above.  
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 Figure 7. Balancing reserves (SC + TC, average of positive and negative 
reserve) and VRE capacity (wind + solar) in Germany. Even though the 
installed capacity of wind and solar power has tripled since 2008, the demand 
for balancing power has decreased. One reason was the cooperation between 
TSOs introduced in 2009/10. 
 
 
Of course these descriptive statistics do not imply that additional wind and solar power reduce the 
balancing reserve requirement. What it does indicate is that other factors must have overcompensated 
for the VRE expansion. There are several candidates: 
 improvements of wind and solar forecasts 
 improvement of load forecasts 
 reduced frequency of plant outages 
 TSOs might have become more cost-conscious and decreased additional internal security 
margins 
 TSO cooperation in reserve sizing 
 improved intra-day market liquidity, and 15 minute trading on power exchanges becoming 
common, allowing better portfolio management 
A quantitative assessment of these drivers is a promising direction of future research. Brouwer et al. 
(2014) report that reserves did not increase in Denmark, Spain, and Portugal either, despite considerable 
VRE expansion. 
During 2009/10, the German TSOs established a balancing power cooperation (Netzregelverbund). 
Today, both reserve sizing and activation is done jointly such that Germany can, in practice, be treated 
as a single balancing area (Zolotarev et al. 2009, Zolotarev & Gökeler 2011). Since 2012, the Danish, 
Dutch, Swiss, Belgium, Czech, and Austrian TSOs have joined to form the “International Grid Control 
Cooperation” (IGCC). At this stage, the members outside Germany cooperate in terms of SC activation 
(imbalance netting), but size reserves individually. 
In academic and policy circles, there seems to be widespread believe that wind and solar power have 
become major drivers for balancing power. This is reflected in the fact that there are numerous published 
studies that assess this relationship. Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, there is no ex-post 
estimation of the impact of the Netzregelverbund or studies that otherwise explain the decrease of the 
balancing reserve in Germany. More generally, the literature on the impact of the size of the balancing 
area on reserve requirements seems to be scarce (an exception is Milligan & Kirby 2009). 
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Reserve sizing is not a question of VRE alone, but of many more factors. Future studies should not 
assess the impact of VRE in isolation, but take these other factors into account. Germany’s historical 
experience also shows that it can be possible to decrease balancing reserves while increasing VRE 
capacity, if system operation is organized more efficiently. 
3.6. Policy options: advancing reserve calculations 
To increase the economic efficiency of reserve sizing, several proposals have been made: dynamic 
sizing, specific solutions for deterministic imbalances, and price-elastic procurement.  
Reserve requirements could be calculated dynamically, i.e. as a function of the current or expected 
system conditions (Holttinen et al. 2012, Breuer et al. 2013, Kippelt et al. 2013). Dynamic sizing is 
currently under assessment in Switzerland (Abbaspourtorbati & Zima 2013) and Germany (Jost et al. 
2014). Bucksteeg et al. (2015) report that German reserve requirements are significantly larger during 
the day than at night. 
Empirical data shows that schedule leaps cause significant deterministic imbalances (recall Figure 4). 
The purpose of balancing power is to respond to unexpected events – but schedule leaps are known to 
occur every day at the same time. A dedicated approach to this source of imbalance seems more 
appropriate. One could mandate smoother transitions between dispatch intervals, shorten intervals 
(Weißbach & Welfonder 2009, Pérez-Arriga & Battle 2012), or introduce a dedicated ramping product 
(Milligan et al. 2009). We propose to use passive balancing, i.e. to use the imbalance price to incentivize 
BRPs to voluntarily stabilize the system (section 5.5).  
A third possibility of improvement concerns price-elastic sizing (Müsgens & Ockenfels 2011). If reserve 
prices are low, system operators should buy more to increase the level of reliability, and vice versa. As 
a side benefit, this would reduce the level of scarcity prices in energy-only wholesale markets (Hogan 
2005). 
Passive balancing and dynamic and price-elastic sizing all complement each other and all of them could 
be pursued. This section has discussed reserve sizing. TSOs then procure reserves on balancing power 
markets. We proceed by discussing these markets. 
 
4. Balancing power market: enabling VRE participation 
Since TSOs do not own generation assets, they procure reserves on balancing power markets. Depending 
on the type of balancing power, suppliers receive a payment for capacity and/or energy, hence the price 
for balancing services is, in general, a two-part tariff. While capacity prices and energy prices for 
positive balancing are always non-negative (TSO pays the supplier), the energy price for negative 
balancing can be positive or negative (suppliers sometimes get paid for reducing output). 
While the technical characteristics of different balancing power types are largely harmonized throughout 
the UCTE (Table 1), balancing power market design is national. A wide range of institutional setups 
exist, ranging from uncompensated supply obligation for generators, regulated or capped prices, 
mandatory offers by generators, to competitive voluntary bidding (ENTSO-E 2015). While almost all 
wholesale electricity prices feature marginal pricing, pay-as-bid pricing is common in balancing power 
markets. In contrast to wholesale electricity markets, balancing power is only demanded by the TSO, 
hence it is a single-buyer market. 
Rebours et al. (2007b), ENTSO-E (2012a), Cognet & Wilkinson (2013), and Fattler & Pellinger (2015) 
compare market rules internationally. TenneT (2011) compares the Dutch and the German market while 
Ela et al. (2011b) discuss American market design. Van der Veen (2013) discusses market design in the 
context of European Network Code development (recall section 2.4). In the following, we will highlight 
relevant aspects of the German market design, report on recent market development, argue that VRE 
can cost-efficiently supply negative balancing, and identify barriers to entry that have prevented VRE 
generators from participating. 
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4.1. Balancing power market design 
German balancing power market design is prescribed by the regulator and has been subject to frequent 
changes. Shortly after the liberalization of wholesale markets in 1989, balancing power markets were 
created in 2001, when bilateral contracts were replaced by public auctions. Since late 2007, the four 
German TSOs have used a common procurement platform.13 Table 4 summarizes auction design as it 
has been in effect since mid-2011, after the latest reform. 
TSOs have a perfectly price-inelastic demand for balancing power. Bidders have to prove that they can 
deliver balancing power according to technical requirements (Table 1) before being allowed to 
participate (“pre-qualification”).14 All auctions are pay-as-bid auctions (see Morey 2001, Chao & 
Wilson 2002, Müsgens et al. 2014). Bids are accepted based on their capacity price only 
(Leistungspreis); dispatch is done according to the energy price (Arbeitspreis). Hence, there are two 
independent merit-orders. PC and SC are tendered for a week, TC for each day. PC is a symmetric (bi-
directional) base product, which means both upward and downward regulation has to be provided for 
an entire week. SC is tendered separately as positive and negative reserves for peak and off-peak periods. 
TC is auctioned in blocks of four hours, again, separately for negative and positive reserves. Hence there 
are four SC products and twelve TC products per auction. Minimum bid sizes apply, but pooling is 
allowed.  
 
Table 4: Balancing power market design in Germany. 
 Primary Control Secondary Control Tertiary Control 
Auction Period week week day 
# of Products 1 (symmetric, base) 4 (pos/neg; peak/off-peak) 12 (pos/neg; blocks of four hours) 
Contract Duration week week (peak/off-peak) four hours 
Capacity Payment yes yes yes 
Energy Payment no yes yes 
Minimum Bid 1 MW 5 MW 5 MW 
Number of Suppliers 21 28 41 
 
The number of pre-qualified suppliers has increased significantly during the past years (Figure 8). 
Today, several “unconventional” suppliers such as municipal utilities, industrial consumers, 
aggregators, and foreign generators are pre-qualified for all three control power types.15 Bidding data is 
anonymous, such that the market share of new suppliers is unknown. 
                                                          
13 At least four studies discuss the impact of this market design reform: Riedel & Weigt (2007), Growitsch & Weber (2008), 
Müller & Rammerstorfer (2008), and Haucap et al. (2014). 
14 Pre-qualification criteria are described in the contract templates provided by the TSOs. 
15 List of prequalified bidders is given at www.regelleistung.net/ip/action/static/provider. In April 2013, the battery company 
Younicos announced the building of a 5 MW Li-On Battery to provide PC, 
www.younicos.com/de/mediathek/pressemeldungen/013_2013_04_29_WEMAG.html. 
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 Figure 8. The number of suppliers of balancing power 
has grown. 
 
4.2. Market size and market development in Germany 
We present empirical data of the German balancing power market in this section, for which we have 
compiled all balancing power bids since 2008.16 We discuss market size, price patterns of different types, 
and price trends. 
Compared to the wholesale electricity market, balancing power is a niche market. Capacity payments 
were about €400mn in 2014. For suppliers, this is the revenue potential of the balancing power market; 
for TSOs, this is the cost of capacity reservation. Divided over total electricity consumption, this 
corresponds to less than 0.8 €/MWhconsumed. In other words, of the household price of about 300 
€/MWhconsumed, balancing power represents about 0.25% (Figure 9). We estimate utilization costs to be 
€ 200-300 million, hence capacity payments are about two thirds of the total costs for balancing; even 
including these costs, balancing services cost consumers little more than one €/MWhconsumed. For other 
countries, Rebours et al. (2007b) report that the balancing system costs 0.5-5% of the wholesale market 
for electrical energy, consistent with the numbers reported here. Cognet & Wilkinson (2013) find a 
similarly wide range of costs across European markets. Hence, balancing power is cheap compared to 
the total cost of the power system. In a sense, even if balancing is regarded as a problem for VRE 
deployment, economically, it is a small problem. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 9. The cost of balancing power provision is very 
small when compared to the wholesale market for energy or 
the retail prices. Source: own calculations, 
Bundesnetzagentur (2014). 
 
                                                          
16 All data are publicly available at www.regelleistung.net, but are provided in somewhat inaccessible formats. A summary of 
current market developments can be found at http://neon-energie.de/Regelleistungsmarkt-2014.pdf. 
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PC and SC are more highly priced than TC, reflecting stricter technical requirements. As symmetric 
base products, PC and SC have been priced at about 20 €/MW·h on average since 2008, and TC 6 
€/MW·h. The fact that PC and SC are similarly priced confirms the impression that they are close 
technical substitutes (Table 1). Maybe surprisingly, negative balancing has been more expensive than 
positive balancing since 2010. The price of some products, notably positive TC, were practically zero. 
For both SC and TC, negative balancing tends to be more expensive in off-peak hours, while positive 
balancing is more expensive in peak hours. This pattern can be well explained by opportunity costs 
(section 3.4). Moreover, peak prices are highly correlated with positive prices, and off-peak prices are 
highly correlated with negative prices (Table 5). 
Table 5: Correlation of prices of SC products. 
 Peak Off-peak Positive  Negative 
Peak 1       
Off-peak 0.20 1     
Positive 0.80 0.36 1   
Negative 0.14 0.88 0.02 1 
Source: own calculations; monthly capacity-weighted average 
prices 2008-14. 
 
The prices for all three products are very volatile and price spikes occur (Figure 10).17 Shocks have had 
dramatic impacts on prices, at least in the short term. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 10. Prices for balancing power are volatile. Demand shocks (TSO cooperation 2009), 
market design changes (2011) and expected low spot prices during Christmas (2013, 2014) led 
to price spikes. 
 
 
Since 2008, balancing prices have decreased significantly. Prices for TC declined more than for other 
products (Figure 11) and prices for positive balancing decreased more than for negative balancing 
(Figure 12). 
                                                          
17 During the Christmas week of 2013, 460 €/MW·h was paid for negative SC. 
Hirth & Ziegenhagen (2015): Balancing power and variable renewables 17 
  
Figure 11. Price for negative and positive balancing (yearly 
average, %-change relative to 2008). 
Figure 12. Price by balancing power type (yearly average, 
only SC and TC, %-change relative to 2008). 
 
Declining prices in conjunction with declining quantities has caused the market size to contract by half 
since 2008 (Figure 13). This is bad news for suppliers, but good news for consumers. While VRE 
capacity has since tripled, volumes have decreased by 15%, as reported above, and costs have declined 
by 50% (Figure 14). Of course, this does not indicate a causal relationship (ceteris paribus, more VRE 
capacity does not decrease costs). On the contrary, it indicates that there is not a one-to-one relationship: 
apparently VRE do not necessarily dominate balancing cost development, even during times of strong 
capacity expansion. 
 
 
 
 Figure 13. The absolute size of balancing markets has 
decreased from €800mn to €400mn since 2008 (capacity 
payments only). 
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 Figure 14. While VRE capacity tripled, the balancing volume decreased by 15% and its costs by 
50% 
 
 
Explaining the evolution of prices is not trivial. Since 2008, the balancing power market has been 
affected by a number of shocks, which have all potentially influenced price development: 
 contracted demand: this has potentially driven forecast improvements, TSO cooperation, and 
portfolio management which collectively outweigh the VRE capacity expansion (recall section 
3.5) 
 supply shocks, such as the nuclear phase-out and the recession: these leave the wholesale market 
with much overcapacity that has entered balancing power markets 
 lower margins on spot markets: these changed opportunity costs for thermal plants (section 4.4) 
 balancing markets becoming more competitive, possibly triggered by market design changes 
(recall section 4.1; Haucap et al. 2014) and regulatory intervention (Growitsch et al. 2010, Heim 
2013) 
A more rigorous evaluation of the price development is a promising direction for further research. In the 
following, we indicate the drivers of the costs of thermal plants to reserve capacity for balancing, and 
argue that because of this cost structure, VRE would be an efficient supplier of downward balancing. 
 
4.3. Providing balancing power with VRE generators 
Wind and solar power are technically well suited for being ramped up or down very quickly, without 
significantly increasing maintenance costs or affecting the life-time of the plant, and with negligible IT 
costs (Kirby et al. 2010, Bömer 2011, Speckmann et al. 2012, Saiz-Marin et al. 2012, Bossanyi & 
Ghorashi 2013, Ela et al. 2014, Görtz & Baumgart 2014). In contrast, ramping of thermal plants causes 
temperature changes for boilers, tubes and turbines, which causes fatigue.  
VRE generators can ramp down only in times when they produce electricity. To ramp up, they need to 
be operated below potential output, such that some generation is constantly curtailed. Consequently, 
while they can technically supply both positive and negative reserves, for economic reasons they are 
better suited to provide downward balancing. 
To provide balancing capacity, one needs to use probabilistic generation forecasts to determine the share 
of output that is highly certain. Fraunhofer (2014) has run a major joint project with German TSOs to 
assess the provision of balancing power by wind power. The share of wind power generation that is 
“firm enough” to participate in balancing power depends on the required security (probability) level and 
the relative size of the forecast error (without forecast errors, all generation could participate). The 
forecast error is a function of three major factors: (i) the size and geographic distribution of the pool of 
wind turbines, (ii) contract duration, and (iii) forecast horizon. A larger pool, shorter contract duration, 
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and shorter forecast horizon reduce forecast errors. If all German wind turbines are pooled, contract 
duration is one hour, and procurement occurs one hour ahead. In more than 50% of all hours of the year 
wind power could supply all negative minute reserve that is required. With day-ahead auctions, this 
would be the case in only 10% of the hours. Görtz & Baumgart (2014) apply a probability level of 
99.994% and find that if all German wind power was pooled, an average of 30% of its output would be 
“firm”. The security level of 99.994% corresponds to the average availability of thermal plants that had 
bid in the balancing power market. Such forecasts are used in practice in Denmark, where wind power 
supplies balancing services (Sorknæs et al. 2013). 
Fraunhofer (2014) also discusses the pros and cons of providing balancing power relative to a fixed 
schedule or relative to potential generation. Running wind turbines at fixed schedules means that some 
generation must be curtailed. Determining potential generation is not trivial, because of wake effects 
within wind parks. 
4.4. The opportunity costs of reserve provision: why VRE should participate 
We will show that a thermal plant’s opportunity costs of reserving balancing capacity is a function of 
the spot price, and that costs are especially high at very low spot prices. Hence, whenever VRE generate 
much electricity (allowing them to provide balancing reserves), thermal plants can only supply at high 
cost. This is a strong argument for encouraging VRE generators to participate in balancing power 
markets. 
The opportunity costs of reserve provision are determined by the foregone profit from sales on the spot 
market. They depend on (i) the foregone status of the generator, (ii) spot market spreads, (iii) ramping 
and cycling costs, and (iv) part-load efficiency losses. Opportunity costs are different for positive and 
negative balancing. A generator that is in the money (infra-marginal) can provide negative balancing 
power at zero cost, because with or without balancing power provision it would be dispatched at its rated 
capacity. To provide positive spinning reserves, the generator has to operate constantly below its rated 
capacity, resulting in reduced electricity sales and part-load efficiency losses. A generator that is out of 
the money (extra-marginal) has to remain online despite making losses; hence its opportunity costs are 
avoided losses. 
Ignoring ramping costs and part-load efficiency, the opportunity costs of providing positive spinning 
reserve, 𝐶𝑡
+, in hour 𝑡 can be written as a function of the spot price 𝑝𝑡, the plant’s variable cost 𝑐, 
minimum load 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 and the amount of balancing power the plant can deliver, 𝑃+. 18 
 
𝐶𝑡
+ = {
                            
(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐)               if 𝑝 > 𝑐
−(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐) ∙ 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑃+⁄  if 𝑝 < 𝑐
 (1)  
 
The opportunity costs of providing negative reserve, 𝐶𝑡
−, can be written as this:19 
 
𝐶𝑡
− = {
0                                              if 𝑝 > 𝑐
−(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐) ∙ (𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝑃−) 𝑃−⁄ if 𝑝 < 𝑐
 (2)  
 
Figure 15 and Figure 16 illustrate opportunity costs of providing balancing reserves of plants with 
different variable costs: natural gas-fired power plants, coal-fired, and wind power.  
At current European commodity prices, these plants have variable costs of around 40 €/MWh, 25 
€/MWh, and zero respectively. If the spot price equals variable costs, the power plant is at the money 
(marginal) and generators are indifferent to produce or not. The opportunity costs for positive balancing 
                                                          
18 Dynamic effects such as ramping or cycling costs, part-load efficiency losses, portfolio effects, and the fact that balancing 
power is provided for more than one hour are ignored. 
19 The opportunity costs over contract duration 𝑇 is the sum of each hour’s costs, 𝐶𝑇
+ = ∑ 𝐶𝑡
+𝑇
𝑡=1 . As spot prices vary, in 
different hours different generators have least opportunity costs. That is why longer contract duration causes inefficiencies.  
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are zero (Figure 15). At lower or higher spot prices, opportunity costs are positive. VRE generators have 
high opportunity costs because of low variable costs. The higher the foregone subsidy, the higher the 
opportunity costs of curtailing generation for the VRE generators. Only at very low or negative prices 
would it be efficient to use VRE generators to provide an upward balancing reserve. 
In contrast, the opportunity costs of VRE for negative balancing (Figure 16) are always zero. At low 
spot prices, the opportunity costs of thermal plants to provide balancing reserve become positive. During 
windy and sunny hours, VRE generation depresses the spot price, driving up the opportunity costs of 
thermal plants to provide negative balancing power. In other words, it is in the hours during which VRE 
generators are able to supply that thermal generators have high costs. In such hours it would be efficient 
to use VRE for downward balancing.  
  
Figure 15. Opportunity costs of providing positive 
balancing reserves. Depending on the price, technologies 
with low or with high variable costs have lower opportunity 
costs.20 
Figure 16. Opportunity costs of providing negative 
balancing reserves. Technologies with lower variable costs 
have lower opportunity costs. Plants that are in the money 
have zero opportunity costs. 
4.5. Policy options: lowering entrance barriers 
We have argued that VRE can efficiently supply negative balancing. However, even though the German 
renewable support system allows VRE to participate in balancing markets,21 wind and solar power seem 
not to participate in significant volumes (Köpke 2013). Apart from implementation issues (Speckmann 
2013, Jansen et al. 2013, Fraunhofer 2014), this seems to be because the design of balancing power 
markets constitutes a prohibitive entry barrier. Three options exist to lower entrance barriers: adjusting 
the balancing power auction design; introducing a second energy auction; fostering passive balancing. 
Lowering entry barriers is not only important for VRE generators, but also for demand side participation 
(Böttger et al. 2015). 
The ability of VRE to provide negative balancing power is limited to times when the primary energy is 
available. German balancing power auctions require the provision of PC and SC for a full week. Over 
that time horizon, weather forecasts are too uncertain for VRE to be able to provide firm reserves. 
Shorter auction periods are necessary for VRE participation. We propose daily auctions with a contract 
duration of one hour, similar to day-ahead spot auctions. This setup is already used in Nordic and some 
Eastern European countries (ENTSO-E 2015). Böttger & Bruckner (2015) estimate that this would 
reduce PC capacity costs by 11-13%. As a side benefit, it also improves the efficiency of thermal plant 
dispatch (Just 2010, Müsgens et al. 2012, Bucksteeg et al. 2015, Sprey et al. 2015). It would also reduce 
must-run of thermal plants (Hirth 2015a), keeping up the spot price and mitigating the market value 
drop of wind and solar power (Hirth 2013, 2015b). In turn, larger quantities of renewables would be 
                                                          
20 Gas price 20 €/MWh, hard coal price 8 €/MWh, CO2 5 €/t, efficiencies for gas-fired combined cycle plant 55%, hard coal 
plant 40%, min load gas plant 30%, hard coal 40%, ramping range 20%. 
21 Under the feed-in-tariff, VRE generators are not allowed to participate. Under the feed-in-premium, which now covers  
more than half of all capacity, they are allowed. 
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competitive (Hirth 2015c). The only costs involved are transaction costs, which could be reduced if the 
power exchange, rather than a proprietary platform, was used to procure balancing power.  
In some countries, a second market for balancing energy opens after the balancing power auction is 
closed. In this “energy-only” market, generators are only rewarded with energy payments for providing 
balancing services. The gate closure of these markets is very short, such that bids can be submitted until 
shortly before real time. Denmark (energinet.dk 2008, Andersen et al. 2012, Sorknæs et al. 2013) and 
The Netherlands (TenneT 2011) are examples of such energy markets. TenneT argues that this feature 
is a key reason for lower costs in The Netherlands compared to Germany. It would augment the existing 
balancing market with an energy-only balancing market. ACER (2012a) proposes such a market in the 
“Balancing Energy” framework guideline. An alternative to energy markets is passive balancing, which 
we discuss in section 5.5. 
In addition, there are two proposals that would increase efficiency, but are unrelated to VRE-specific 
entry areas. Borggrefe & Neuhoff (2011) and Sőrés et al. (2014) have proposed conditional bids. These 
are joint bids on spot and balancing power markets, for example offering balancing services only in 
those hours where plants are dispatched. Kahn et al. (2001) and Müsgens et al.  (2011) argue that pay-
as-bid pricing should be replaced by uniform pricing as it is more robust against uncertainty, reduces 
information asymmetry between companies, and mitigates market power. Several European countries 
use marginal pricing (ENTSO-E 2015). 
 
5. Imbalance settlement system: setting the right incentives  
Imbalance settlement occurs after the activation of balancing power (ex post). It involves two steps: the 
determination of the imbalance price, or “imbalance charge”, and the allocation of remaining costs or 
profits. The imbalance price is the price that BRP have to pay for being out-of-balance and is paid per 
MWh deviation from the submitted schedule (€/MWhdeviation), hence it is an energy price. This section 
discusses imbalance settlement, pricing rules, and the two ways in which the imbalance price can work 
as an economic incentive for VRE generators (and other market actors): improving forecasts, and 
passive balancing. 
5.1. Imbalance settlement regimes 
Imbalance price mechanisms are nationally regulated and differ along several dimensions (Vandezande 
et al. 2010, Borggrefe & Neuhoff 2011, Elexon 2013, ENTSO-E 2015):  
 two-price system (dual price) v. one-price system (single price) 
 imbalance price calculated from balancing costs or from spot price 
 whether or not capacity cost is included  
 average v. marginal pricing 
 cost-based or without punitive mark-ups (constant or variable costs; mark-ups at high 
imbalances, or minimal incentives) 
 non-discriminatory pricing or a differentiated price for generators and loads 
 settlement intervals: 15 min, 30 min, 60 min 
 publication lag: time between end of settlement interval and publication of the imbalance price 
 whether or not there is a legal obligation to be balanced   
The German imbalance pricing mechanism is determined by the regulator (Bundesnetzagentur) and has 
been adjusted several times during recent years. Since May 2010, there has been a common German 
imbalance price (Ausgleichsenergiepreis, reBAP). The price is determined for settlement intervals of 15 
minutes as the average dispatch cost (net energy payments divided by net balancing energy). The system 
is designed to be cost-neutral in the sense that all dispatch costs are borne by unbalanced BRPs. As the 
energy payment in the balancing power market is subject to pay-as-bid pricing, the imbalance price is 
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generally different from the energy price in the balancing market; in general, it does not represent the 
marginal costs of activating balancing reserves. 
Germany uses a non-discriminatory one-price system, hence short (undersupplied) and long 
(oversupplied) BRPs are settled with the same price. Apparently, however, the German regulator 
perceived the imbalance spread as being too low to provide a sufficiently strong incentive to deter 
imbalances (Bundesnetzagentur 2012a, Consentec 2012). Consequently, a punitive mark-up was 
introduced in late 2012.22  
TSOs publish imbalance prices with a delay of several months. BRPs trade imbalances in the so-called 
“day after” market. In a one-price system this does not affect expected costs – but it reduces uncertainty. 
The costs for capacity reservation are socialized via grid fees, as in most European countries (ENTSO-
E 2015). 
The relevant economic incentive for decisions that concern imbalances is the imbalance spread, being 
the difference between imbalance price and the corresponding day-ahead price. Usually, BRPs on the 
“wrong” side, i.e. those increasing (aggravating) the system imbalance, pay the imbalance spread, while 
BRPs that are on the “right” side earn a spread. 
5.2. Estimates of VRE balancing costs 
Numerous studies estimate the balancing costs of wind and solar power, i.e. the €/MWh cost for 
deviations from schedules. Holttinen et al. (2011) and Hirth et al. (2015) survey the literature on wind 
power, and Hirth (2015b) on solar power. 
Model-based studies report costs to be between zero and 6 €/MWh, even at very high penetration rates 
of up to 40%. A linear trend of these estimates shows a moderate increase in balancing costs with wind 
penetration (Grubb 1991, Strbac et al. 2007, Gross et al. 2006, Smith et al. 2007, DeMeo et al. 2007, 
Tuohy et al. 2009, Gowrisankaran et al. 2011, Holttinen et al. 2011, Mills & Wiser 2012, Garrigle & 
Leahy 2013). 
Studies that estimate balancing costs from observed imbalance prices show a very different picture: cost 
estimates vary between zero and 13 €/MWh and seem to be uncorrelated with penetration (Holttinen 
2005, Pinson et al. 2007, Obersteiner et al. 2010, Holttinen & Koreneff 2012, Katzenstein & Apt 2012, 
e3 consult 2014, Hirth et al. 2015). 
 
 
 
 Figure 17. Wind power balancing cost estimates from the 
literature (updated from Hirth et al. 2015). 
 
 
Peculiarities of balancing power markets and imbalance pricing might explain this apparent paradox. 
Market concentration can be high in balancing power markets and price variation can be large (section 
                                                          
22 Bundesnetzagentur BK6-12-024 published on 25 October 2012, 
www.transnetbw.de/downloads/strommarkt/bilanzkreismanagement/BK6-12-024_Beschluss_2012_10_25.pdf 
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4). For example, balancing costs were 11 €/MWh in Austria in 2014, several times higher than in 2011, 
while costs remained stable in neighboring Germany (e3 consult 2014). Imbalance prices sometimes 
include punitive mark-ups that are unrelated to underlying costs (section 5). This is one reason for the 
Dutch balancing cost of 9 €/MWh, as Pinson et al. (2007) explain. One should be careful with 
generalizing cost estimates from tight markets or prices that do not reflect costs. 
5.3. German imbalance prices 
Figure 18 displays the average imbalance spread for the years 2011-14 as a function of the system 
imbalance (see also Table 6). 
 
Figure 18. Imbalance spread as a function of system imbalance, based on 140,000 quarter-hourly observations 2011-14. 
 
The positive correlation between the system imbalance and the imbalance price indicates that, overall, 
the pricing mechanism provides an economic incentive in the right direction. When the system was long, 
long BRPs lost on average 50 €/MWh, since they had paid 40 €/MWh on the day-ahead market, and 
received -10 €/MWh as an imbalance price. When the system was short, the imbalance spread was 52 
€/MWh. In less than one percent of all quarter-hours the imbalance spread provided a perverse incentive 
to BRP, being negative in times of system undersupply or positive in times of system oversupply. 
Surprisingly however, the imbalance price was only 35 €/MWh on average, while the day-ahead spot 
market price was 41 €/MWh. Hence, during these years, it would have been profitable – albeit unlawful 
– for a BRP to be constantly short. In other words, the imbalance market and the day-ahead market were 
not free of arbitrage opportunities. In one-price systems, imbalances are only costly if correlated with 
the system imbalance: an imbalance that is uncorrelated with the system imbalance pays an average 
imbalance spread of zero.23 
 
Table 6: Imbalance prices and incentive to BRPs 
 
Average 
 
. 
System long 
 
(60% of all hours) 
System short 
 
(40% of all hours) 
System very long 
(<-2000MW) 
(4% of all hours) 
System very short 
(>2000MW) 
(2% of all hours) 
Imbalance price* 35 €/MWh -10 €/MWh 94 €/MWh -43 €/MWh 183 €/MWh 
Day-ahead price* 41 €/MWh 40 €/MWh 42 €/MWh 39 €/MWh 50 €/MWh 
Imbalance spread* -7 €/MWh -50 €/MWh 52 €/MWh -82 €/MWh 132 €/MWh 
*Time-weighted average. Deviations caused by rounding. 
                                                          
23 A simulation of hundred normally distributed imbalances resulted in an average imbalance spread of 0.01 €/MWh. 
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Over the course of the day, the imbalance spread is everything but randomly distributed (Figure 19, 
Figure 20). The first and last quarter-hour of each hour features significant deviation from the mean, 
especially during the morning and the evening ramps. For example, the average imbalance spread just 
before 7 a.m. is 32 €/MWh, and the average spread just after 7 a.m. is -27 €/MWh. This pattern is rooted 
in schedule leaps (recall Figure 4). We will argue below that BRPs should be allowed to respond to these 
price incentives and balance them passively. 
  
Figure 19. The quarter-hourly imbalance spread during the 
morning ramp. Just before the full hour, the system is 
short, leading to positive spreads. 
Figure 20. The quarter-hourly imbalance spread during the 
evening ramp. Just before the full hour, the system is long, 
leading to negative spreads. 
5.4. The balancing price: an incentive for better forecasting 
TSOs and regulators often view the imbalance price primarily from a cost allocation perspective, i.e. as 
a mechanism to recover the cost of utilizing balancing reserves. However, from an efficiency 
perspective, the crucial role of the imbalance price is as an economic incentive to BRPs to avoid (or not 
avoid) imbalances. 
BRPs can reduce imbalances in many ways: by improving forecast tools, updating forecasts more 
frequently, shifting from hourly to 15 min scheduling, trading more actively on intra-day markets, and 
dispatching assets more accurately. Rational BRPs invest in such imbalance management measures up 
to the point where the marginal cost of reducing imbalances equals the marginal benefit of doing so, i.e. 
the imbalance spread. For statically and dynamically efficient resource allocation, the imbalance price 
should reflect the marginal economic costs of solving imbalances by means of balancing power. This is 
currently not the case. 
Efficient resource allocation requires the imbalance price to represent marginal, not average, costs of 
balancing. The combination of pay-as-bid auctions on the balancing power market and average pricing 
on the imbalance market leads to inefficiently low imbalance prices. Hence, either pay-as-bid payment 
should be replaced by marginal pricing (for more reasons to do this, see 4.5), or the imbalance price 
should be based on marginal deployment costs. 
Similarly, capacity costs should not be socialized, but borne by those BRPs that caused the need for 
reservation (Vandezande et al. 2010). Given the practical difficulties of implementing such a pricing 
rule under uncertainty, a pragmatic approach could be to allocate these costs as a mark-up on the 
imbalance price. This would increase the imbalance spread by about 20 €/MWh24 in absolute terms. If 
                                                          
24 In 2011, the costs for positive and negative capacity reservation (excluding PC) were € 160 million and € 310 million, 
respectively. The amount of energy activated was 7 TWh and 18 TWh (Bundesnetzagentur 2012b). Allocating capacity costs 
through imbalance prices would have increased the imbalance spread by about 20 €/MWh, both in periods of undersupply 
and oversupply. 
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reserves are sized to cover the loss of the largest unit, as is the case for PC, one might consider allocating 
capacity costs to this unit. 
Setting the correct incentive might be more relevant for VRE generators than for other BRPs. Relative 
to their output, imbalances are larger for these than for other generators. Forecasting methodologies are 
relatively new and the potential for improvement seems to be vast, both for wind power (dena 2010, 
Foley et al. 2012, Colak et al. 2012, Freedman et al. 2013, Siefert et al. 2013, Hong et al. 2014) and 
solar power (Chen et al. 2011, Fernandez-Jimenez et al. 2012).25 
5.5. Passive and active balancing 
When TSOs deploy balancing power, they actively balance the system. The price paid for this service is 
the capacity and the energy payment for balancing power. The imbalance price provides the incentive 
to BRPs to “passively” balance the system by purposely deviating from the schedule (“self-balancing”). 
TSOs can either actively balance the system by sending a dispatch signal to the suppliers of balancing 
power, or passively balance the system by sending a price signal to BRPs. 
There are two preconditions for effective passive balancing: a timely publication of the imbalance price, 
and the legal ability for BRPs to respond to the price signal. Traditionally, the Dutch TSO has used this 
mechanism quite heavily (TenneT 2011), while the German TSOs have followed a philosophy of active 
balancing. In fact, in Germany it is illegal for BRPs to be deliberately unbalanced– even if this stabilizes 
the system. The German regulator and TSOs expect BRPs to stick to their schedules, not to respond to 
price signals. 
Passive balancing is a close substitute for active balancing, especially for slow reserves. Moreover, 
deterministic imbalances – such as schedule leaps – could be efficiently targeted by passive balancing. 
Fostering passive balancing could be an alternative (indeed, a very good substitute) to the introduction 
of energy-only balancing markets. 
5.6. Policy options: the imbalance charge as price signal 
There are three major sources of inefficiency in the German imbalance market: practical and legal 
barriers to passive balancing, and an inefficiently low imbalance spread.  
Passive balancing should be encouraged. First, it needs to be legalized, and second, the imbalance price 
needs to be published shortly after real time. In France, Benelux, and the UK, prices are published within 
one hour (ENTSO-E 2015). 
Imbalance prices should reflect the marginal costs of balancing. To do so, they should include the costs 
of holding reserves, and they should reflect the marginal cost of deploying them. Marginal pricing could 
be implemented by either switching to marginal pricing on balancing markets, or by adjusting the 
imbalance pricing formula accordingly. Average pricing and socializing capacity cost both tend to 
depress the imbalance spread. In other words, the German imbalance spread is currently inefficiently 
low. Current market rules constitute a positive externality: unbalanced actors do not bear the full costs 
of their action. The incentive that BRPs receive to keep their portfolio balanced is too weak. This implies 
that the incentive for VRE generators to improve forecasts is too weak.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper has discussed three interfaces between variable renewables and the balancing system: reserve 
requirements, participation of VRE generators in balancing markets, and the incentives provided by the 
imbalance price. These links interact and need to be considered jointly to explore the entire solution 
space of policy makers.  Take the example of passive balancing: allowing BRPs to respond to price 
                                                          
25 For solar power forecasting see also IEA Task 46, http://task46.iea-shc.org/. 
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signals might be a good substitute for reforms of the balancing market, and could reduce the need for 
holding reserves. 
We believe we can draw four broad findings from this study. Firstly, the balancing reserve requirement 
depends on a multitude of factors; the wind and solar power forecast error is only one of several 
important drivers. Secondly, while German VRE capacity has tripled since 2008, reserves have been 
reduced by 15%. This indicates that other factors can be quantitatively more important than VRE, even 
in periods of strong capacity expansion. One can interpret this as an indication that balancing power is 
not necessarily a major barrier to VRE integration at moderate penetration rates. Thirdly, the design of 
balancing power markets determines the incentives for VRE generators to provide balancing power 
themselves. Current market design constitutes a major barrier for participation. Finally, the design of 
imbalance settlement systems determines the incentives for BRPs to balance their portfolios. 
Specifically, it sets the incentives for VRE generators to produce accurate forecasts. Currently, the 
incentives for accurate forecasting are inefficiently low. 
Throughout the paper we have also suggested a number of policy options, summarized in Table 7. We 
propose a switch to dynamic sizing and price-elastic reserve procurement. In the balancing power 
market, entry barriers for variable renewables should be lowered to stimulate participation. Specifically, 
we recommend shifting to daily auctions and hourly contracts, and switching from pay-as-bid to 
marginal pricing. In the area of imbalance settlement, we emphasize the role of the imbalance price as 
a price signal. Today, the imbalance price is often understood as a cost allocation mechanism, but we 
believe it should be viewed as a price signal. Passive balancing should be encouraged and prices should 
be published as close as possible to real time. We recommend including the costs of capacity reservation 
in the imbalance price.  
 
Table 7: Policy options. 
 Proposal Intended Effect 
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) 
Dynamic sizing (currently static) More efficient sizing of reserves 
Price-elastic procurement (currently inelastic) Increase security level in times of cheap reserves 
Specific measures for deterministic imbalances 
(currently all covered by balancing reserves) 
Use balancing only for stochastic imbalances 
B
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 4
) 
Daily auctions (currently some weekly) More suppliers (VRE and others) 
Contract duration of one hour (currently 
longer) 
More suppliers (VRE and others) 
Marginal pricing (currently pay-as-bid) More robust against uncertainty, market power, 
information asymmetry 
Use power exchange for procurement 
(currently proprietary platform) 
Reduce transaction costs 
Im
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(s
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 5
) 
Legalize passive balancing (currently illegal) Reduce system imbalance 
Price publication within minutes (currently 
months) 
Allow BRPs to respond to price signal 
Marginal pricing (currently average) Economically efficient price signals to BRPs 
Reserve costs allocated via imbalance price 
(currently grid fees) 
Economically efficient price signals to BRPs 
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